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Abstract
In this paper we use data from the years 1997 through 2003 to evaluate the
size efficiency of Indian banks. Following Maindiratta (1990) we consider a bank
to be too large if breaking it up into a number of smaller units would result in a
larger output bundle than what could be produced from the same input by a single
bank. When this is the case, the bank is not size efficient. Our analysis shows
that many of the banks are, in deed, too large in various years. We also find that
often a bank is operating in the region of diminishing returns to scale but is not a
candidate for break up.
The author thanks Abhiman Das of Reserve Bank of India for providing the
data.
2ARE SOME INDIAN BANKS TOO LARGE?
AN EXAMINATION OF SIZE EFFICIENCY IN INDIAN BANKING
Despite the presence of over seventy banks of public, private, and foreign ownership, the Indian
banking industry is dominated by only a handful of them. Among them State bank of India (SBI)
alone accounted for over 22% of the total assets and more than a quarter of the total employment
in the entire banking industry in the year 2003. Though much smaller than SBI, the others, ICICI
Bank, Canara Bank, and Punjab National Bank, each accounted for about 5% of the total bank
assets in the same year. In this context, it is interesting to ask: are SBI and the other three banks
mentioned above in some sense “too large” and if so, are they the only ones? Moreover, if some
banks are, in deed, deemed to be large, can we recommend what their optimal size would be?
There is, of course, no simple answer to this question. We first need to define the criterion of
largeness. For the present study we use the concept of sub-additivity of the production technology
to define largeness. The production technology is locally sub-additive if a given input bundle can
be broken up into two or more smaller bundles that can together produce greater output than what
can be produced unilaterally by a single firm from the bundle under consideration. Thus, in the
presence of sub-additivity breaking up a single bank and redistributing its input bundle to several
smaller banks would enhance productive efficiency.
Deregulation of banks and other measures of financial liberalization nested within the
broader economic reforms introduced over the past years provide the Indian banking industry a
unique opportunity for growth. Privatization of selected public sector firms along side entry of
private firms into industries previously reserved exclusively for the public sector has greatly
increased the demand for funds from the capital market. At the same time, increased competition
from existing and newly entering banks (both domestic and foreign) threatens to undercut the
profits earned by a bank unless it operates efficiently. Understandably, efficiency and
productivity of banks has attracted considerable interest from both policy makers and academics.
Das (1997) analyzed technical, allocative, scale, and overall efficiencies of public sector
banks. The study found a decline in overall efficiency in the year 1995-96 driven mainly by a
decline in technical efficiency. Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik (1998) compared performance across
the three categories of banks, public, private and foreign, in India, using two measures of
profitability, return on assets and operating profit ratio, and four efficiency measures, net interest
margin, operating profit to staff expense, operating cost ratio and staff expense ratio (all ratios
except operating profit to staff expense having average total assets in the denominator). Traded
3private banks were superior to public sector banks with respect to profitability measures but not
with respect to efficiency measures. Non-traded private banks did not significantly differ from
public sector banks in respect of either profitability or efficiency.1 In a more recent study, Das
(1999) compares performance among public sector banks for three years in the post-reform
period, 1992, 1995 and 1998. Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) used a shadow cost function to
examine the comparative patterns of total factor productivity growth of private and public sector
banks over the period 1985-1996.Ram Mohan and Ray (2004) analyzed revenue maximization
efficiency of banks of different ownership. In all of the studies listed above, the question has been
whether there is room for improving efficiency or productivity of a bank retaining its existing
structure. This paper goes beyond measurement of technical efficiency of a given input-output
bundle and investigates whether output from the observed input bundle of a firm could be
extended beyond the technically efficient projection by addressing the question of possible sub-
additivity at the observed point. This is the first study of its kind in the context of Indian banking.
The only other study of size efficiency in the banking literature is by Ray and Mukherjee (1998)
analyzing large US banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
background including the conceptual issues and the nonparametric methodology of Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Section 3 reports the findings from the empirical analysis. Section
4 concludes.
2. The Theoretical Background
2.1 Conceptual Issues: Technical, Scale, and Size Efficiencies
Consider a firm using a single input, x, to produce a single output, y. Suppose that its observed
input-output bundle is (x0, y0) and that the maximum output producible from any input level x is
given by the production function
y* = f(x). (1)
Clearly, y0 ≤ f(x0) = .*0y A measure of the technical efficiency of the firm under consideration is
.
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The firm is considered to be technically efficient, if and only if, y0 = f(x0).Clearly, when this is the
case, it is not possible to produce a higher level of output from the given level of the input, x0.
Further, at this point on the production function, the average productivity is
                                                
1 See also Ram Mohan (2002, 2003).
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Note that improvement in technical efficiency leads to an increase in output without a change in
the input. As a result, average productivity increases. When full technical efficiency is attained,
average productivity reaches a maximum for the given level of the input. There may exist,
however, other technically efficient input-output combinations where the average productivity is
even higher. An interesting question to ask is whether it is possible to increase average
productivity by altering the input scale. All input output bundles that lie on the production
function are technically efficient. In the absence of constant returns to scale (CRS), however, the
average productivity
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varies with the input level. Suppose that average productivity reaches a maximum at the input
level xE that produces output yE .The scale efficiency of the input level x0 can then be measured as
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The input-output combination (xE, yE) is known as the efficient scale of production.
Any firm using a higher level of input than xE experiences diminishing returns to scale
and is usually regarded as too large. In some cases, however, operating at the efficient scale may
not be the best thing to do for a firm. If the firm is technically inefficient, in order to attain full
technical efficiency it needs to increase the output level without altering the input. For scale
efficiency, however, it would need to change both the input and the output levels. For a firm
exhibiting diminishing returns to scale, this may require a decrease in the output as well as the
input. In some cases, producing the maximum output from a given input bundle might be of
primary importance. For example, in a health care facility in a less developed country, serving the
maximum number of individuals from a given bundle of resources would be more important than
operating at a level that maximizes average productivity.
It might appear that one could downsize the firm to the efficient scale and create the
requisite number of smaller firms that would collectively use up the given input bundle. If, for
example, x0 equals mx*, one might create m smaller firms each using input x* and producing
output f(x*). As a result, the total output produced from x0 would be mf(x*) which would exceed
5the output f(x0) that would be producible from the input x0 by a single firm. This is not the case,
however, unless m happens to be an integer. This is best explained by a simple example.
Consider the piece-wise linear production function
f(x) =2.5x – 4; 2≤ x ≤ 6;
                  = 6.5 + 0.75 x ; 6 ≤ x ≤ 18; (6)
                 = 20; x ≥ 18.
It is shown by the broken line ABCDE in Figure 1. Clearly, the efficient scale is attained at the
point C where the average productivity attains a maximum level of .611  Now consider a firm
shown by the point F. It uses 8 units of x to produce 10 units of the output y. Note that at the input
level x = 8, f(x) = 12.5. Thus, if it could eliminate technical inefficiency it would move to the
point G on the production function. Clearly the firm F is operating at a scale that is larger than the
optimal scale. The efficient input scale is 75% of the actual input level of this firm. Suppose that
the firm is downsized to the input level x = 6 where it produces the output level y = 11. Another
firm using the remaining 2 units of the input would produce only 1 unit of the output.
Collectively, therefore, the two firms would be producing 12 units of the output. This is clearly
less than what could be produced from the efficient operation of a single firm using 8 units of the
input. Thus, the firm cannot be regarded as “too large”. Of course, if CRS held, the smaller firm
using 2 units of x would produce 3
11 units of the output. The total output of the two firms would
then be 3
44 units. The point H on the ray OC shows this. But in the case of CRS the question of
scale efficiency becomes irrelevant because average productivity does not change with the input
scale.
Consider, next, a firm that uses14 units of the input. In the absence of technical
inefficiency, this firm would produce 17 units of output. If the firm was broken up into three
firms - two of them using the scale efficient input level of 6 units and the third one using 2 units
of the input, the smaller firms would collectively produce 23 units of the output. Thus, this firm is
clearly “too large” and breaking it up into several smaller firms would be technically more
efficient than operating it as a single firm. But it would be even better to split it into two identical
firms each producing 11.75 units of output from 7 units of the input. In this case, the total output
produced would be 23.5 units. It may be noted that if the firm was to be broken up into three
identical units, the total output would 23 units. Thus, we find that the firm is best broken up into
two identical firms. It is important to note that even though the firm is to be broken up into two,
the smaller units are not scaled down versions of the pre-existing firm. Each of them is
constructed as a 70-30 weighted average of the firm at C and the firm at J.
6Maindiratta (1990) characterized a firm as “size inefficient” when the total output
produced collectively by several firms is greater than what could be produced from its input
bundle by a single firm operating efficiently.
For the numerical example the underlying production function was assumed to be known.
In reality, one must construct a production function from sample data on inputs and output.
2.2 The Nonparametric Methodology
In most empirical applications of productivity and efficiency analysis, some explicit
functional form of a production, cost, or profit function (e.g., the Cobb Douglas) is specified and the
parameters of the model are estimated by appropriate econometric methods.  Validity of results
derived from the analysis, naturally, depends on the appropriateness of the functional form specified.
The mathematical programming method of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) introduced by
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (CCR) (1978) provides a nonparametric alternative to econometric
modeling. The original CCR model considered technologies that exhibit constant returns to scale
globally. In a subsequent paper, Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) generalized the DEA
methodology to accommodate variable returns to scale. In DEA one makes only a few general
assumptions about the production technology without specifying any functional form.  Assume that
(a) each observed input output bundle (xj, yj) (j = 1,2,…,N) is feasible,
(b) the production possibility set is convex,
(c) inputs are freely disposable, and
(d) outputs are freely disposable.
By virtue of (a) and(b),any ),( yx satisfying
∑∑∑ =≥=== N jjN jjN jj Njjyxx
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will be feasible. Hence, utilizing (c) and (d), the production possibility set can be empirically
constructed as
∑ ∑ ∑ =≥=≤≥= N N N jjjjjj NjyyxxyxS
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7Varian (1984) calls S an inner approximation to the true production possibility set. It is the smallest
set satisfying (a)-(d). If, additionally, one assumes constant returns to scale, the restriction
1
1
=∑N jλ can be dispensed with and the production possibility set would be reconstructed as
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The DEA LP problem for measuring the output-oriented technical efficiency is:
max  ϕ
          s. t. ∑ ≥N jj yy
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Inverse of the optimal value of the objective function )( *1ϕ  from the problem provides a measure of
the output-oriented technical efficiency of the input-output bundle (x0, y0).
When the CRS production possibility set is used as the reference, the measure of technical efficiency
is
,1C
CTE φ= (11)
where
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As shown by BCC, the scale efficiency of the firm using the input bundle x0 is
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The measured level of scale efficiency does not, by itself, indicate whether a firm is operating
under increasing or decreasing returns to scale. Nor does it identify the efficient scale. Banker
(1984) has shown, however, that one can identify the nature of local returns to scale by examining
the optimal solution of the CCR problem. Suppose that at the optimal solution of (11a) jλ equals
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output combination ),( 00 yx Cφ lies on the frontier of the CRS production possibility set. Thus, by
virtue of CRS, ),( 001 yx
C
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β is also located on the CRS frontier. It may be easily verified, however,
that β
φC is the optimal solution of the output-oriented BCC problem for the input-output bundle
).,( 001 yxβ This shows that ),(
001 yx
C
β
φ
β is a point of tangency between the VRS and the CRS
frontiers and, therefore, 01 xβ is the efficient input scale. Of course, when β exceeds unity, locally
diminishing returns to scale holds and the input bundle x0 has to be scaled down. Similarly, if β is
less than unity, increasing returns to scale holds and x0 is smaller than the efficient scale.
Break Up of a Large Firm
We now describe a method introduced by Maindiratta (1990) to determine whether it is
technically more efficient to break up a large firm with a specific input bundle into a number of
smaller firms than to let it operate as a single production unit. Again, consider the single-output,
multiple-input case.  Clearly, when the production function is sub-additive at the input bundle x0 ,
there exist K smaller input bundles xk (k =1, 2,…, K) such that ∑ =K k xx
1
0 and
∑ >K k xfxf
1
0 ).()(  In this case,  It is technically more efficient to break up a single firm using
the input bundle x0 into K smaller firms using the bundles xk (k = 1, 2,…, K). In that sense, a
single firm using input x0 is too large. Specifically, suppose that (x0, y0) is the observed input-
output combination of the firm. Further, let 0*0
0 )( yxf ϕ= be the maximum output producible
from x0. Similarly, let )(0**
k
k
k xfyy == ϕ be the maximum output producible from the input
bundle xk. Then, the K smaller bundles would collectively produce the output
0
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= ϕ from the input bundle x0. Thus, the single firm using the input bundle x0 is
too large if ∑ >K k
1
*
0
* .ϕϕ
We need to address two questions before we can proceed any further. First, how do we
decide the number of smaller firms that the existing firm should be broken up into, if it is to be
9broken up at all?  In other words, how do we determine K ? Second, how do we determine the
size of each constituent input bundle after the break up? We address the second question first. To
do this, set K to some positive integer value tentatively. Our objective initially is to determine the
composition of the K identical smaller input bundles2 that will maximize the collective output
producible from them. Let xˆ  be the input bundle and yˆ  the maximum output producible from .xˆ
Clearly, under the usual assumptions of DEA, )ˆ,ˆ( yx   would be a feasible input-output
combination so long as there exists some ),...,,( 21 Nλλλλ = such that
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,1,ˆ,ˆ λλλ  and ),...,2,1(0 Njj =≥λ .The K firms would together
use input xKˆ   and the collective output would be yKˆ The  problem is to select the vector λ so as
to maximize ϕ where 0ˆ yyK ϕ≥ while .ˆ 0xxK ≤ For this, we solve the following DEA problem.
max   ϕ
s.t. ;ˆ
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Of course, we still need to determine K. At this point, all we know is that K is some positive
integer. Now define, ).,...,2,1( NjK jj == λα Then the DEA problem (13) becomes
max     ϕ
   s.t.
                      ;0
1
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N
j
j
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α
                                                
2 It can be shown that it makes no difference whether the smaller input bundles are identical or different.
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At the optimal solution of this problem, K* represents the desired number of smaller (identical)
units that the single firm should be broken up into. Note that this is a mixed integer programming
problem where one variable (K) is constrained to be a positive integer while the other variables
can take any non-negative value.  An interesting feature of this problem is that if K is pre-set to 1,
it reduces to the familiar BCC problem for a VRS technology. On the other hand, if K is allowed
to take any positive value (not necessarily an integer), the problem in (14) reduces to the output-
oriented CCR problem for a CRS technology. Suppose that the maximum value of the objective
function in problem (14) is Kϕ while those in the corresponding BCC and CCR problems are
Vϕ and Cϕ , respectively. Then, by virtue of the hierarchy of the feasible sets of the problems,
.CKV ϕϕϕ ≤≤ (15)
As is well known, the scale efficiency of the input bundle x0 is measured as
.1≤= C
V
SE ϕ
ϕ
(16)
Maindiratta defines the size efficiency of the firm as
.1≤= K
V
ϕ
ϕσ (17)
It is clear from (15) that
.1≤≤ σSE (18)
If ,1=σ there is no size inefficiency and even when we are allowed to select any integer value
for K in problem (14), the optimal solution selects K* = 1.If on the other hand, K* > 1, the firm is
                                                                                                                                                
For a proof, see Ray (2004).
11
size inefficient. Deviation of the measure σ from unity shows the shortfall in output from a
single-firm production relative to a multi-firm production using the same input bundle x0.
Although the DEA problem in (14) is a mixed integer programming problem, given that
the integer constrain applies to only one variable, one can solve the problem easily using the
“branch and bound” algorithm. The steps are as follows.
Step 1: Solve the CRR problem (i.e., without any restriction on the sum of the λj s.)
             Compute ∑
=
=
N
j
jK
1
** .λ If *K is an integer, stop; otherwise go to step 2.
Step 2: Define [ ]** KK =−  = largest integer no greater than .*K
Solve the problem (14) with the restriction .*−= KK
               Denote the optimal value of the objective function as *−ϕ .
Step 3: Define [ ] .1** +=+ KK
 Solve the problem (14) with the restriction .*+= KK
               Denote the optimal value of the objective function as *+ϕ .
Step 4: }.,max{ **** +−= ϕϕϕ The optimal K  is correspondingly determined.
3.The Empirical Analysis
In this study we evaluate the size efficiency of Indian banks for the years 1997 through
2003. The actual number of banks covered in any one year varies between 68 (in 2003) and 73 (in
2000). We follow the intermediation approach in our definition of inputs and outputs. A 4-input
3-output production technology is conceptualized. The inputs included are labor, physical capital,
borrowed funds (including deposits), and equity. The outputs are credits (adjusted for non-
performing loans), investments, and other incomes.
Table 1 reports the year-wise summary statistics of the input and output variables. While
labor is measured by the number of employees, all other variables are in crores (i.e., 10s of
millions) of rupees. The yearly means of all the variables show a slight increase over time.
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Because all variables except labor are measured in nominal values unadjusted for inflation, an
upward trend is only to be expected. At the same time, an overall growth of banking appears to
have contributed to this trend. This is evident from the increase in the average level of
employment over the years. It may be noted that for State bank of India values of most of the
variables (shown in the Max column) are about 15 times the average values for the entire sample.
Table 2 shows the values of K* from the optimal solution of the mixed integer
programming problem (14) for the four selected banks for the different years within the sample
period. State Bank of India is obviously way too large and should be broken up into more than 25
smaller banks in all years except in 2003 when it is a candidate for break up into 15 banks.
Although much smaller than SBI, Canara Bank is also found to be too large in all the years
should be broken up - some times into more than 10 smaller units. Punjub National Bank was not
a candidate for break up during the first two years. But from 1999 onwards it came up as too large
in each year. It is interesting to note that ICICI Bank, often showcased as the most efficient new
private sector bank, also was found to be size inefficient in 3 of the 7 years considered. In fact, in
the year 2000 it was a candidate for break up into as many as 9 smaller banks!
Table 3 shows the year-wise distribution of K* (from the optimal solution of problem
14). In every year, at least 25% of all banks were too large. In particular, during 1999 nearly 50%
of all banks were size inefficient and candidates for break up into smaller units. During the last
two years of the study, however, there were no more that 4 banks that were larger than 10 times
their optimal size.
For all banks that were found size inefficient in any year the individual levels of VRS
technical efficiency (BCCTE), K*, size efficiency (SZE), and scale efficiency (SE) are reported
for each occurrence in Table 4. In this Table while BCCTE shows the ratio between the actual
and the technically efficient output of a bank, SZE expresses the technically efficient output as a
proportion of what could be maximally produced by an appropriate number of smaller banks
collectively using the observed input bundle of any individual bank.  For example, in 1998 the
actual output of ICICI Bank was about 88% of what could be produced from its input bundle at
full technical efficiency. The entry in the SZE column shows that this efficient output bundle
itself would be 95.8% of what could be produced if it was to be broken up into 2 smaller banks
(as shown in the K* column).
It can be seen that in all of the sample years, SBI is found to be technically efficient.
However, its size efficiency shows that its actual output is lower than what could be produced
from a number of smaller banks using its total input bundle in all of these years. In fact, it is only
85.8% of what 44 smaller banks could produce in the 1999. Even ICICI Bank exhibits a
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significant degree of size inefficiency in the year 2000. Although it is found to be technically
efficient, breaking it up into 4 smaller banks would result in a nearly 12% increase in all of its
outputs. Size efficiency is found to be lower than 0.90 in 33 cases. In 2 cases (ICICI Bank in 2000
and Union Bank in 1999) the size efficiency falls below 0.80.
An interesting point to note is that the measured values of scale and size efficiencies
differ little for any individual bank. This is natural given the fact that, as shown in the branch-
and-bound procedure above, the optimal K* and β (the sum of the optimal values of the λjs from
the CCR model) are quite close implying that the size-efficient and the scale-efficient input
bundles are not very different. This, in its turn, might suggest that measuring size efficiency adds
little new information beyond what is obtained from analyzing the scale efficiency of a bank. This
is not true, however. That is because although the scale- and size-efficient input bundles are going
to be quite similar, the benchmark bank is to be constructed in quite different ways for the two
approaches. This can be illustrated by an example. Consider the case of SBI in the year 1999. The
“peer banks” and the associated weights for constructing the scale- and size-efficient benchmark
small bank are shown below:
      Peer Banks                         weights for construction of benchmark
                                            scale efficient                  size efficient
State Bank of Hyderabad      0.2537 0.2454
Federal Bank        0.0781                                  0.0725
Bank of Nova Scotia            0.6401 0.6351
Citibank       0.0281 0.0621
State Bank of Indore             0                                           0.0209
As can be seen from above, not only are the weights assigned to the individual banks in
the peer group are different, one bank (State Bank of Indore) features in the construction of the
size-efficient benchmark but not in the other one.
Table 5 reports the 23 occasions where banks in different years were found to be size
efficient even though in all of these cases they were operating in the region of diminishing returns
to scale. Note that in each instance β (the sum of the optimal λjs from the CCR model) was
greater than unity. Thus, by this criterion, they were above their efficient scale size. Yet, the
mixed integer programming problem yields an optimal value of K equal to unity in all of these
14
cases. Hence, they are not candidates for break up into smaller units. As noted before, in the
popular perception, any firm that is bigger than its efficient scale size and is operating in the
region of diminishing returns should be scaled down. But the information from Table 5 drives
home the fact that a bank is not necessarily too big even if it exhibits diminishing returns at its
observed scale.
Tables 6 and 7 show another interesting finding. Just as a bank operating above its
efficient scale is not necessarily too large, when a large bank is indeed a candidate for break up,
its size-efficient benchmark itself may fall either in the diminishing returns or the increasing
returns region. In the 56 cases shown in Table 6, K* is less than β. This implies that the
benchmark smaller bank in each of these cases would be bigger than the optimal scale size and
would therefore be in the region of diminishing returns.  The opposite is true in the 108 cases
shown in Table 7 where K* exceeds β and the benchmark bank is in the region of increasing
returns.
We may now summarize the main findings of this study:
• SBI was too large in all of the years considered in the sample. The other three –
Canara Bank, Punjub National Bank, and ICICI Bank were also found to be too
large in some or all years.
• Numerous other banks were also found to be size inefficient in various years and
breaking them up into smaller units would result in greater increase in output
than what would be producible even if they operated efficiently at their existing
sizes.
• Banks that are larger than their scale efficient sizes are not necessarily candidates
for break up.
• Even when it is recommended that a banks should be broken up, the benchmark
smaller unit may be larger or smaller than its scale efficient size.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we use data covering the period 1997 through 2003 to measure size levels of
efficiency of individual Indian banks. The findings do suggest wide spread size inefficiency
across banks and years. While results from any one year can be affected by random variation in
outputs and inputs, banks like SBI and others that are persistently found to be size inefficient
should be examined more closely in order to determine whether the sheer bulk of their size
hinders smooth flow of information within the organization thereby lowering (size) efficiency.
Two points need to be emphasized here. First, the benchmark smaller banks constructed for any
15
individual bank that is found to be too large are usually convex combinations of other banks of
various ownership categories. There may, in deed, be systemic constraints that would not allow a
public sector bank like SBI to emulate (even in part) the organizational structure and operating
processes of a foreign bank (like Citibank) or a new public sector bank (like UTI Bank).
Second, we have not considered any adjustment cost associated with breaking up a large
organization. It may very well be the case that such adjustment costs overwhelm the gains from
breaking up and restructuring a large bank. Thus, our results should be interpreted with caution.
In this sense, our findings should be viewed as broad targets the attainability of which should be
assessed in light of specific constraints in any given context.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Inputs and Outputs
N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Borrowed Funds 71 7791.32 15461.96 74.53 117661.7
Labor 71 13541.79 30807.06 85 236204
(Physical) Capital 71 14915.66 20690.35 267 117092
Equity 71 595.8641 1063.3 3.72 7977.17
Credit 71 3116.66 6183.69 17.19 46827.56
Investments 71 3508.01 7369.2 40.46595 57690.18
Other Incomes 71 135.4266 322.719 0.67 2643.07
YEAR=1998
Borrowed Funds 72 9181.4 18163.53 95.6 139184.8
Labor 72 13358 30913.93 79 239649
(Physical) Capital 72 17114.46 24541.45 281 150632
Equity 72 719.3601 1282.77 4.82 9608.18
Credit 72 3730.61 7211.01 19.64 54982.24
Investments 72 4116.64 8834.11 52.9051 69731.12
Other Incomes 72 165.0147 347.0429 0.91 2820.17
YEAR=1999
Borrowed Funds 71 11226.55 22835.13 115.65 178121
Labor 71 13514.54 30830.42 35 237504
(Physical) Capital 71 19770.23 31113.85 262 219366
Equity 71 745.4559 1380.98 5.6 10402.31
Credit 71 4701.69 9150.88 26.19 71286.52
Investments 71 4732.3 9795.59 61.73208 76446.4
Other Incomes 71 174.9186 401.2011 1.1 3284.69
YEAR=2000
Borrowed Funds 73 12865.32 25936.64 139.46 206099.1
Labor 73 13053.23 29991.49 30 233433
(Physical) Capital 73 20954.71 33760.16 264 247761
Equity 73 832.7153 1549.59 6.62 12147.28
Credit 73 5630.04 11399.16 34.2 91878.69
Investments 73 5623.64 11515.72 70.61488 91813.63
Other Incomes 73 215.0726 434.0284 0.9 3569.32
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                               Table 1 (contd)
N   Mean Std Dev    Min    Max
YEAR=2001
Borrowed Funds 71 15515.08 31825.85 164.4 253550.4
Labor 71 12392.66 27797.93 38 214845
(Physical) Capital 71 22543.51 35483.03 245 259330
Equity 71 928.7914 1714 7.47 13461.54
Credit 71 6863.04 15047.99 43.18 122876.5
Investments 71 6901.65 13638.14 75.31045 106740.8
Other Incomes 71 238.6342 494.6163 0.81 4017.82
YEAR=2002
N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Borrowed Funds 71 18338.94 36118.77 178.59 279884.1
Labor 71 11786.31 26877.61 37 209622
(Physical) Capital 71 28115.62 58297.44 404 423934
Equity 71 1157.14 2063.18 8.41 15224.38
Credit 71 8224.75 18055.98 41.11 145142
Investments 71 8562.66 15633.66 76.39147 114005.1
Other Incomes 71 335.563 537.9273 2.76 4174.49
YEAR=2003
Borrowed Funds 68 21108.4 40100.36 188.11 305426.9
Labor 68 12254.76 27355.31 35 209797
(Physical) Capital 68 29495.66 57744.47 386 406073
Equity 68 1397.04 2386.92 10.33 17203.38
Credit 68 10128.81 21766.49 49.06 172347.9
Investments 68 10383.67 18484.03 85.58558 133281.3
Other Incomes 68 460.9 808.8341 4.76 5740.26
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Table 2. Values of K* for Selected Banks
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
CANARA BANK 6 8 11 9 12 7 8
PUNJUB NATIONAL BANK 1 1 5 7 11 11 7
ICICI BANK 1 2 1 9 4 1 1
STATE BANK OF INDIA 25 33 44 25 54 33 15
Table 3. Distribution of K*
Year K* =1     2-5 6 - 10 11 - 15 16 - 20 21 - 30 31 - 40 K* > 40 total
1997 48 17 4 1 0 1 0 0 71
1998 54 12 3 1 1 0 1 0 72
1999 36 20 6 5 2 1 0 1 71
2000 51 9 6 4 1 2 0 0 73
2001 41 22 3 3 1 0 0 1 71
2002 53 13 1 2 1 0 1 0 71
2003 50 10 6 1 1 0 0 0 68
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                   Table 4. Technical, Size, and Scale Efficiency of Banks that are “Too Large”
  K*   Year          Bank Name  BCCTE      SZE     SE
2 1997STATE BANK OF HYDERABAD 0.98724 0.98289 0.98179
2 1997STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 1 0.99752 0.9944
2 1997ALLAHABAD BANK 0.97788 0.99406 0.99218
2 1997SYNDICATE BANK 1 0.97618 0.97599
2 1997VIJAYA BANK 0.87581 0.99765 0.99701
2 1997BANK OF MADURA LTD. 0.83944 0.99421 0.98809
2 1997HDFC BANK LTD. 1 0.94207 0.93505
2 1997VYSYA BANK LTD. 0.89276 0.98727 0.98704
2 1997BANK OF TOKYO 0.91285 0.98663 0.98594
2 1998STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 1 0.9753 0.97458
2 1998HDFC BANK LTD. 1 0.9751 0.96419
2 1998ICICI BANKING CORPORATION 0.87749 0.95838 0.95274
2 1999ANDHRA BANK 1 0.96257 0.95742
2 1999BANK OF MAHARASHTRA 0.99649 0.98947 0.98543
2 1999PUNJAB & SIND BANK 0.94874 0.98992 0.9861
2 1999BANK OF PUNJAB LTD. 0.93047 0.9811 0.97947
2 1999DEVELOPMENT CREDIT BANK LTD. 0.90476 0.98819 0.98635
2 1999KARUR VYSYA BANK LTD. 0.90312 0.9959 0.99289
2 1999SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. 0.94604 0.98955 0.98909
2 1999TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK LTD. 0.86275 0.99036 0.98598
2 1999BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS 0.95224 0.96736 0.96735
2 2000ALLAHABAD BANK 0.91079 0.97057 0.97043
2 2000DENA BANK 0.95532 0.97127 0.97119
2 2000FEDERAL BANK LTD. 1 0.99317 0.99282
2 2000JAMMU & KASHMIR BANK LTD. 0.87457 0.98516 0.98266
2 2000VYSYA BANK LTD. 0.8387 0.99084 0.98757
2 2000STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 0.99919 0.98432 0.98356
2 2001STATE BANK OF BIKANER & JAIPUR 0.98198 0.95639 0.95636
2 2001STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE 1 0.98703 0.98688
2 2001DENA BANK 0.85281 0.965 0.96476
2 2001VIJAYA BANK 0.88246 0.97379 0.97197
2 2001FEDERAL BANK 0.97722 0.97873 0.97856
2 2001GLOBAL TRUST BANK 0.96341 0.99061 0.98908
2 2001JAMMU & KASHMIR BANK 0.88309 0.99873 0.99856
2 2001KARUR VYSYA BANK 0.87573 0.99422 0.9907
2 2002STATE BANK OF BIKANER & JAIPUR 0.97891 0.98018 0.97928
2 2002ALLAHABAD BANK 0.92964 0.95564 0.95338
2 2002DENA BANK 0.90686 0.94423 0.94277
2 2002VIJAYA BANK 0.93428 0.99397 0.99242
2 2002JAMMU & KASHMIR BANK 0.90843 0.97839 0.97768
2 2002VYSYA BANK 0.8179 0.99489 0.99122
2 2002HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANK 0.90776 0.99925 0.99729
2 2003STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 0.95207 0.99688 0.97649
2 2003CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 0.95358 0.98933 0.98928
    K*   Year          Bank Name     BCCTE    SZE     SE
2 2003DENA BANK 0.9498 0.96638 0.96552
2 2003Federal Bank Ltd. 0.93944 0.99993 0.99607
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2 2003ING Vysya Bank Ltd. 0.94534 0.99817 0.9963
3 1997STATE BANK OF PATIALA 1 0.92183 0.92104
3 1997CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1 0.99925 0.99917
3 1997ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE 1 0.9901 0.98944
3 1997GRINDLAYS BANK 1 0.87364 0.87354
3 1998STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 0.94047 0.932 0.93187
3 1998STATE BANK OF PATIALA 1 0.95478 0.95408
3 1998UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK 0.98246 0.95596 0.95436
3 1998VIJAYA BANK 0.91687 0.99725 0.99589
3 1998VYSYA BANK LTD. 0.82888 0.9802 0.97766
3 1998HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BKG.CORPN. 0.8982 0.94448 0.94361
3 1999STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 0.97457 0.94497 0.94485
3 1999ALLAHABAD BANK 0.90044 0.94152 0.94143
3 1999DENA BANK 0.99781 0.95356 0.95305
3 1999VIJAYA BANK 0.8154 0.99739 0.99727
3 1999JAMMU & KASHMIR BANK LTD. 0.88457 0.99097 0.9907
3 1999VYSYA BANK LTD. 0.72878 0.98293 0.9826
3 1999ABN AMRO BANK N.V. 1 0.98795 0.9838
3 1999DEUTSCHE BANK (ASIA) 1 0.98437 0.98378
3 2000STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 1 0.93907 0.93891
3 2000CORPORATION BANK 1 0.93011 0.9301
3 2001STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 0.96253 0.97382 0.96672
3 2001CORPORATION BANK 1 0.86295 0.86281
3 2001HDFC BANK 1 0.97521 0.97499
3 2001VYSYA BANK 0.79382 0.96107 0.95867
3 2001ABN AMRO BANK 1 0.9975 0.99657
3 2001HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANK 1 0.9234 0.92283
3 2002STATE BANK OF PATIALA 1 0.96922 0.96739
3 2002CORPORATION BANK 0.95401 0.9138 0.91378
3 2002INDIAN BANK 1 0.8835 0.88339
3 2003STATE BANK OF PATIALA 1 0.94561 0.94455
3 2003ALLAHABAD BANK 0.96425 0.96586 0.96562
3 2003SYNDICATE BANK 0.94569 0.95181 0.95099
3 2003Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. 0.93693 0.97492 0.97267
4 1997UNION BANK OF INDIA 0.98981 0.87718 0.87711
4 1997FEDERAL BANK LTD. 0.94004 0.96818 0.96774
4 1997HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BKG.CORPN. 1 0.9025 0.90249
4 1998INDIAN BANK 0.90137 0.93945 0.93742
4 1998SYNDICATE BANK 0.9562 0.97159 0.97127
4 1998GRINDLAYS BANK 1 0.95046 0.94961
4 1999STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 1 0.9588 0.95632
4 2001STATE BANK OF PATIALA 1 0.89504 0.8947
4 2001ALLAHABAD BANK 0.89903 0.94087 0.93967
4 2001INDIAN BANK 0.86384 0.9462 0.94619
4 2001ICICI BANK 1 0.87964 0.87961
    K*   year          Bank Name  BCCTE     SZE      SE
4 2003UNION BANK OF INDIA 0.97279 0.94447 0.94415
5 1997INDIAN BANK 0.79258 0.95673 0.95634
5 1999PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1 0.89371 0.89369
5 1999STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 0.95779 0.96663 0.96541
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5 2000SYNDICATE BANK 1 0.97433 0.97402
5 2001INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK 1 0.95053 0.95049
5 2001SYNDICATE BANK 0.97841 0.94283 0.94209
5 2001UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK 0.94596 0.94364 0.94353
5 2001STANDARD CHARTERED GRINDLAYS BANK 0.75986 0.9965 0.99646
5 2002CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 0.93705 0.92766 0.92656
5 2002SYNDICATE BANK 0.94944 0.94631 0.94546
5 2002UNION BANK OF INDIA 0.93285 0.96269 0.9622
6 1997BANK OF BARODA 1 0.8577 0.85766
6 1997CANARA BANK 1 0.86286 0.86258
6 1999STATE BANK OF PATIALA 1 0.97791 0.97437
6 2000UNION BANK OF INDIA 0.90735 0.90372 0.90335
6 2003STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 1 0.93792 0.93617
7 1997UCO BANK 0.98313 0.95722 0.95625
7 1999UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK 0.965 0.94943 0.9494
7 2000PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1 0.90992 0.90968
7 2001ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE 1 0.96764 0.96654
7 2002CANARA BANK 1 0.86234 0.86227
7 2003PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1 0.89251 0.89225
7 2003HSBC Ltd. 1 0.96143 0.96102
8 1998CANARA BANK 1 0.93191 0.93152
8 1999CORPORATION BANK 1 0.92188 0.92164
8 2000HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BKG.CORPN. 1 0.90012 0.90008
8 2001UNION BANK OF INDIA 0.92292 0.92004 0.91957
8 2003CANARA BANK 1 0.92452 0.92409
8 2003CORPORATION BANK 0.98951 0.91098 0.90975
9 1999INDIAN BANK 0.84582 0.93031 0.9303
9 1999HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BKG.CORPN. 0.99448 0.83848 0.83838
9 2000BANK OF BARODA 1 0.8169 0.81689
9 2000CANARA BANK 1 0.88682 0.88669
9 2000ICICI BANKING CORPORATION 1 0.78687 0.78687
9 2001CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 0.92215 0.90659 0.90635
9 2003BANK OF BARODA 0.9771 0.91406 0.91382
10 1997CITI BANK 1 0.87727 0.87368
10 1998BANK OF BARODA 1 0.85538 0.85535
10 1998UNION BANK OF INDIA 0.93663 0.93008 0.92999
10 1999CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1 0.88355 0.88349
11 1999CANARA BANK 0.96957 0.86233 0.86221
11 1999ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE 1 0.9008 0.90049
11 1999UNION BANK OF INDIA 1 0.79522 0.79515
11 2000ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE 1 0.9674 0.96602
11 2000STANDARD CHARTERED GRINDLAYS BANK 1 0.95649 0.9559
11 2001PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1 0.89726 0.89684
    K*   year          Bank Name  BCCTE     SZE      SE
11 2002PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1 0.91418 0.91389
12 1998CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1 0.94173 0.94148
12 1999GRINDLAYS BANK 1 0.87556 0.87507
12 2001CANARA BANK 1 0.81759 0.81755
13 2000BANK OF INDIA 1 0.86225 0.86212
13 2001BANK OF INDIA 1 0.98693 0.9866
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14 1997BANK OF INDIA 1 0.87813 0.87813
14 2002BANK OF BARODA 1 0.87161 0.87135
15 1999SYNDICATE BANK 1 0.96198 0.96152
15 2000CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 0.96125 0.87675 0.87647
15 2003STATE BANK OF INDIA 1 0.97407 0.97403
16 1999INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK 1 0.97338 0.97259
16 2001BANK OF BARODA 0.93108 0.86664 0.86661
16 2002UCO BANK 0.92145 0.90363 0.90358
17 1998BANK OF INDIA 1 0.90015 0.90004
17 1999BANK OF BARODA 1 0.80761 0.80761
18 2000UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK 0.97196 0.89976 0.89934
20 2003INDIAN BANK 0.93196 0.95203 0.95199
25 1997STATE BANK OF INDIA 1 0.95516 0.9551
25 2000STATE BANK OF INDIA 1 0.89846 0.89844
25 2000INDIAN BANK 0.84391 0.87327 0.87325
27 1999BANK OF INDIA 1 0.89281 0.89259
33 1998STATE BANK OF INDIA 1 0.94026 0.94015
33 2002STATE BANK OF INDIA 1 0.92264 0.92262
44 1999STATE BANK OF INDIA 1 0.85838 0.85837
54 2001STATE BANK OF INDIA 1 0.87914 0.87914
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             Table5. Size Efficient Firms Operating Under Diminishing Returns to Scale
                     Bank Name    year BCCTE   SE    β
BANK OF MAHARASHTRA 1997 0.99597 0.99904 1.1239
BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS 1997 0.8722 0.99888 1.27144
DEVELOPMENT CREDIT BANK LTD. 1997 0.87112 0.99899 1.0665
DHANALAKSHMI BANK LTD. 1997 0.86458 0.99061 1.2014
PUNJAB & SIND BANK 1997 0.94538 0.99794 1.2329
UNITED WESTERN BANK LTD. 1997 0.83792 0.99794 1.20266
UTI BANK 1997 0.9352 0.99893 1.05077
BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS 1998 0.85317 0.99543 1.08532
BHARAT OVERSEAS BANK LTD. 1998 0.96673 0.9953 1.197
PUNJAB & SIND BANK 1998 0.97637 0.99982 1.1401
BANK OF RAJASTHAN LTD. 1999 0.83846 0.99928 1.0282
BANK OF TOKYO 1999 0.80354 0.99646 1.0877
CENTURION BANK 1999 0.90212 0.99296 1.3118
KARNATAKA BANK LTD. 1999 0.85479 0.99912 1.3852
STATE BANK OF BIKANER & JAIPUR 1999 0.9476 0.99912 1.0769
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK LTD. 2000 0.87501 0.99357 1.4055
DEVELOPMENT CREDIT BANK 2001 0.87604 0.99993 1.4734
KARNATAKA BANK 2001 0.85664 0.99864 1.07697
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK 2001 0.89894 0.99917 1.57501
UNITED WESTERN BANK 2001 0.88254 0.99989 1.00885
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK 2002 0.8797 0.99805 1.25716
TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK 2003 0.87463 0.99785 1.05839
VIJAYA BANK 2003 0.97569 0.99949 1.2873
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Table 6. Large Banks with Constituent Smaller Banks Operating under DRS
     Obs                      bkname year    K*         β
1ABN AMRO BANK N.V. 1999 3 3.731
2ALLAHABAD BANK 2002 2 2.1294
3ANDHRA BANK 1999 2 2.3261
4BANK OF BARODA 2000 9 9.0597
5BANK OF BARODA 2001 16 16.0147
6BANK OF BARODA 2003 9 9.2186
7BANK OF INDIA 1997 14 14.0631
8BANK OF INDIA 1998 17 17.1994
9CANARA BANK 2001 12 12.0186
10CANARA BANK 2002 7 7.6738
11CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1999 10 10.5785
12CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 2000 15 15.1754
13CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 2001 9 9.5452
14CORPORATION BANK 1999 8 8.2427
15CORPORATION BANK 2001 3 3.168
16DENA BANK 1999 3 3.0865
17DENA BANK 2000 2 2.0887
18DENA BANK 2001 2 2.1505
19DEUTSCHE BANK (ASIA) 1999 3 3.0768
20DEVELOPMENT CREDIT BANK LTD. 1999 2 2.2852
21FEDERAL BANK LTD. 1997 4 4.3558
22GRINDLAYS BANK 1999 12 12.4018
23HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BKG.CORPN. 1997 4 4.0186
24HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BKG.CORPN. 2000 8 8.5157
25HSBC Ltd. 2003 7 7.0661
26ICICI BANK 2001 4 4.592
27INDIAN BANK 1997 5 5.2419
28INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK 2001 5 5.018
29JAMMU & KASHMIR BANK LTD. 1999 3 3.1893
30JAMMU & KASHMIR BANK LTD. 2000 2 2.3018
31ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE 1997 3 3.2333
32SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. 1999 2 2.2665
33STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 1998 3 3.3833
34STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 1999 3 3.3831
35STANDARD CHARTERED GRINDLAYS BANK 2001 5 5.4009
36STATE BANK OF INDIA 1998 33 33.5626
37STATE BANK OF INDIA 2001 54 54.7899
38STATE BANK OF PATIALA 1997 3 3.2364
39STATE BANK OF PATIALA 1998 3 3.1694
40STATE BANK OF PATIALA 1999 6 6.8216
41STATE BANK OF PATIALA 2002 3 3.1229
42STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 1998 2 2.0297
43STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 1999 4 4.3328
44SYNDICATE BANK 1997 2 2.0934
45SYNDICATE BANK 1998 4 4.0945
46SYNDICATE BANK 2001 5 5.1179
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47UCO BANK 1997 7 7.3354
48UCO BANK 2002 16 16.0681
49UNION BANK OF INDIA 2001 8 8.1183
50UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK 1998 3 3.2617
51UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK 1999 7 7.1679
52UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK 2000 18 18.1481
53VIJAYA BANK 1997 2 2.2761
54VIJAYA BANK 2001 2 2.1405
55VYSYA BANK 2001 3 3.35352
56VYSYA BANK LTD. 1999 3 3.1023
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             Table 7. Large Banks with Constituent Smaller Banks Operating Under IRS
Obs bkname year     K*       β
1ABN AMRO BANK 2001 3 2.8264
2ALLAHABAD BANK 1997 2 1.3754
3ALLAHABAD BANK 1999 3 2.9314
4ALLAHABAD BANK 2000 2 1.8169
5ALLAHABAD BANK 2001 4 3.3358
6ALLAHABAD BANK 2003 3 2.5419
7BANK OF BARODA 1997 6 5.5233
8BANK OF BARODA 1998 10 9.9394
9BANK OF BARODA 1999 17 16.6102
10BANK OF BARODA 2002 14 13.6491
11BANK OF INDIA 1999 27 26.5942
12BANK OF INDIA 2000 13 12.5749
13BANK OF INDIA 2001 13 12.3392
14BANK OF MADURA LTD. 1997 2 1.4852
15BANK OF MAHARASHTRA 1999 2 1.3626
16BANK OF PUNJAB LTD. 1999 2 1.8738
17BANK OF TOKYO 1997 2 1.9269
18BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS 1999 2 1.9993
19CANARA BANK 1997 6 5.4542
20CANARA BANK 1998 8 7.6676
21CANARA BANK 1999 11 10.475
22CANARA BANK 2000 9 8.4771
23CANARA BANK 2003 8 7.3089
24CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1997 3 2.9377
25CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 1998 12 11.7573
26CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 2002 5 4.1603
27CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 2003 2 1.8251
28CITI BANK 1997 10 9.3681
29CORPORATION BANK 2000 3 2.9859
30CORPORATION BANK 2002 3 2.9914
31CORPORATION BANK 2003 8 7.435
32DENA BANK 2002 2 1.6598
33DENA BANK 2003 2 1.7529
34FEDERAL BANK 2001 2 1.9489
35FEDERAL BANK LTD. 2000 2 1.8629
36FEDERAL BANK LTD. 2003 2 1.0804
37GLOBAL TRUST BANK 2001 2 1.8249
38GRINDLAYS BANK 1997 3 2.8264
39GRINDLAYS BANK 1998 4 3.6841
40HDFC BANK 2001 3 2.8708
41HDFC BANK LTD. 1997 2 1.7105
42HDFC BANK LTD. 1998 2 1.4803
43HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANK 2001 3 2.8762
44HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANK 2002 2 1.0763
45HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BKG.CORPN. 1998 3 2.7606
46HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BKG.CORPN. 1999 9 8.4007
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47ICICI BANKING CORPORATION 1998 2 1.3946
48ICICI BANKING CORPORATION 2000 9 8.9645
49INDIAN BANK 1998 4 3.3088
50INDIAN BANK 1999 9 8.8437
51INDIAN BANK 2000 25 24.8296
52INDIAN BANK 2001 4 3.9576
53INDIAN BANK 2002 3 2.5098
54INDIAN BANK 2003 20 19.1624
55INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK 1999 16 15.8759
56ING VYSYA BANK LTD. 2003 2 1.4749
57JAMMU & KASHMIR BANK 2001 2 1.9381
58JAMMU & KASHMIR BANK 2002 2 1.8329
59JAMMU & KASHMIR BANK 2003 3 2.4043
60KARUR VYSYA BANK 2001 2 1.19
61KARUR VYSYA BANK LTD. 1999 2 1.261
62ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE 1999 11 10.7504
63ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE 2000 11 10.654
64ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE 2001 7 6.3265
65PUNJAB & SIND BANK 1999 2 1.7075
66PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 1999 5 4.9331
67PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 2000 7 6.3335
68PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 2001 11 10.304
69PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 2002 11 10.6384
70PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK 2003 7 6.6375
71STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 1999 5 4.5427
72STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 2000 2 1.8084
73STANDARD CHARTERED GRINDLAYS BANK 2000 11 10.3695
74STATE BANK OF BIKANER & JAIPUR 2001 2 1.9718
75STATE BANK OF BIKANER & JAIPUR 2002 2 1.3845
76STATE BANK OF HYDERABAD 1997 2 1.5622
77STATE BANK OF INDIA 1997 25 24.3186
78STATE BANK OF INDIA 1999 44 43.2524
79STATE BANK OF INDIA 2000 25 24.6034
80STATE BANK OF INDIA 2002 33 32.8231
81STATE BANK OF INDIA 2003 15 14.0477
82STATE BANK OF PATIALA 2001 4 3.3547
83STATE BANK OF PATIALA 2003 3 2.6231
84STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 1997 2 1.534
85STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 2000 3 2.6171
86STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 2001 3 2.5563
87STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA 2003 2 1.4758
88STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE 2001 2 1.9609
89SYNDICATE BANK 1999 15 14.8036
90SYNDICATE BANK 2000 5 4.5824
91SYNDICATE BANK 2002 5 4.5391
92SYNDICATE BANK 2003 3 2.557
93STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 2003 6 5.3505
94TAMILNAD MERCANTILE BANK LTD. 1999 2 1.5953
95UNION BANK OF INDIA 1997 4 3.3385
96UNION BANK OF INDIA 1998 10 9.9077
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97UNION BANK OF INDIA 1999 11 10.9009
98UNION BANK OF INDIA 2000 6 5.4906
99UNION BANK OF INDIA 2002 5 4.5355
100UNION BANK OF INDIA 2003 4 3.7186
101UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK 2001 5 4.6795
102VIJAYA BANK 1998 3 2.6129
103VIJAYA BANK 1999 3 2.3745
104VIJAYA BANK 2002 2 1.3931
105VYSYA BANK 2002 2 1.45382
106VYSYA BANK LTD. 1997 2 1.72623
107VYSYA BANK LTD. 1998 3 2.37396
108VYSYA BANK LTD. 2000 2 1.2182
29
30
References:
Banker, R.D. (1984), “Estimating the Most Productive Scale Size Using Data Envelopment
Analysis”, European Journal of Operational Research 17: 1 (July) 35-44.
Banker, R.D., A. Charnes, and W.W. Cooper (1984), “Some Models for Estimating Technical
and Scale Inefficiencies in Data Envelopment Analysis,” Management Science, 30:9 (September),
1078-92.
Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper, and E. Rhodes (1978) “Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making
Units,”European Journal of Operational Research 2:6 (November), 429-44.
Das, Abhiman (1997). Technical, Allocative and Scale Efficiency of Public Sector Banks in
India, RBI Ocasional Papers, 18, June-September.
Das, Abhiman (1999) Profitability of Public sector Banks: A Decomposition Model; RBI
Ocasional Papers, 20, 1.
Kumbhakar, Subal C. and Subrata Sarkar (2003)  Deregulation, Ownership, and Productivity
Growth in the Banking Industry: Evidence from India; Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking;
35:3; 403-424.
Maindiratta, A. (1990) “Largest Size-Efficient Scale and Size Efficiencies of Decision Making
Units in Data Envelopment Analysis”, Journal of Econometrics, 46, 39-56.
Ram Mohan, T. T. (2002) ‘Deregulation and performance of public sector banks’, Economic and
Political Weekly 37 (5): 393-397.
Ram Mohan, T. T. (2003) ‘Long-run performance of public and private sector bank stocks’,
Economic and Political Weekly 38 (8): 785-788.
Ram Mohan, T. T. and S. C. Ray (2004): “Comparing Performance of Public and Private Sector
Banks: A Revenue Maximisation Efficiency Approach’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.39,
No.12, pp.1271-1276.
Ray, S.C. (2004) Data Envelopment Analysis: Theory and Techniques for Economics and
Operations Research (Cambridge University Press).
Ray, S.C. and K. Mukherjee (1998b) "A Study of Size Efficiency in U.S. Banking: Identifying
Banks that are too Large";  International Journal of Systems Science (1998), vol. 29, no. 11, pp
1281-1294.
Sarkar, Jayati, Sarkar, Subrata and Bhaumik, Suman K. (1998) ‘Does ownership always matter? –
evidence from the Indian banking industry’, Journal of Comparative Economics 26: 262-81.
Varian, H. R.(1984), “The Nonparametric Approach to Production Analysis,” Econometrica 52:3
(May)
579-97.
